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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics is 
based at Fordham University School of Law and 
sponsors programs, develops publications, supports 
scholarship on contemporary issues of law and 
ethics, and encourages professional and public 
institutions to integrate moral perspectives into 
their work.  Over the past decade, the Stein Center 
and affiliated Fordham Law faculty have examined 
the ethical dimensions of the administration of 
criminal justice, including the ethical and historical 
dimensions of the death penalty and execution 
methods.  The Stein Center has submitted amicus 
briefs in three prior cases in which this Court has 
been asked to examine methods of execution:  Bryan 
v. Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999), cert. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000), which 
the Court had granted to consider whether 
electrocution violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause; Baze v. 
Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), in which this Court 
examined the constitutionality of lethal injection as 
implemented in Kentucky and in which this Court 
cited the Stein Center brief; and Glossip v. Gross, 
                                            
1   Pursuant to Rule 37.3, the parties have consented to 
the filing of this brief.  Letters of consent have been filed 
with the Clerk.  No counsel for a party authored this brief 
in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a 
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation 
or submission of this brief.  No person other than amicus 
curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission. 
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135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), in which this Court examined 
Oklahoma’s implementation of lethal injection.   
Implementation of lethal injection as a method of 
execution implicates ethical questions important to 
the Stein Center.  The evolution of execution 
methods in the United States generally suggests a 
public consensus opposed to the infliction of severe 
pain and suffering in the course of executing 
individuals sentenced to death.  At the same time, it 
is doubtful whether in practice execution methods 
achieve that goal.  In the context of lethal injection, 
there are serious concerns whether prison officials, 
legislators, and courts have responded to the risks 
associated with the implementation of lethal 
injection in an ethical manner.   
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In recent years, this Court has been asked to 
review the constitutionality of lethal injection 
protocols on numerous occasions.  Such review has 
resulted in necessary judicial scrutiny of the most 
severe punishment a State may inflict.  This case 
concerns the ability of courts to continue to perform 
this essential judicial function.  Arkansas (and 
separately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, Arthur v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of 
Corr., No. 16-15549, 2016 WL 6500595 (11th Cir. 
Nov. 2, 2016), cert. pet. filed No. 16-602) wrongly 
understood this Court’s decisions in Baze and 
Glossip to foreclose judicial review of the 
constitutionality of a State’s chosen execution 
method and protocol unless the State already 
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authorizes another method to which the inmate may 
point as a feasible and readily available alternative.  
This Court should reject this impermissible 
narrowing of the scope of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of execution methods. 
(1) State legislatures repeatedly have 
demonstrated a willingness to adopt and retain 
methods of executions that violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.  For this reason, this Court has long 
recognized a right to meaningful judicial review of 
the constitutionality of execution methods.   
(2)  The Arkansas legislature initially delegated 
every detail for carrying out lethal injection 
executions to the state department of corrections.  
Decades later, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
determined that this delegation of authority violated 
the separation of powers doctrine, and the 
legislature subsequently narrowed the method-of-
execution statute.  Now, only four years after 
requiring the legislature to identify with specificity 
the State’s execution method, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court has interpreted this Court’s decisions in Baze 
and Glossip to limit the alternate execution methods 
on which an inmate may rely to show a 
constitutional violation to those methods already 
identified in the statute.  The Arkansas Supreme 
Court reached this result notwithstanding the lower 
court’s finding that the State’s midazolam protocol 
may have posed a substantial risk of intolerable 
pain.  By interpreting Baze and Glossip in this 
manner, Arkansas has insulated its execution 
method statute from judicial review. 
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(3)  This Court’s decisions foreclose such an 
approach.  Baze and Glossip nowhere require a 
statutory alternative but require only that such an 
alternative be feasible.  The need for uniform 
application of federal constitutional law precludes 
such an approach, which would fracture Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence by allowing an inmate to 
succeed in challenging an unnecessarily painful 
method of execution in one State but not another.  If 
the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation is not 
reversed, a State legislature will not only be 
permitted to select the most painful and barbaric 
method of execution, but it also will be able to 
prevent constitutional review by limiting the 
available options to those selected by the legislature.   
This Court should grant the Petition and 
summarily reverse.   
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT CONSISTENTLY HAS 
RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW TO ENSURE THAT 
EXECUTION METHODS COMPORT 
WITH THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Historically, State legislatures have moved 
toward the adoption of new execution methods as a 
result of a growing consensus that the prior methods 
posed a risk of unnecessary cruelty or lingering 
death.  Judicial review has played an important role, 
serving as a catalyst for movement toward more 
humane methods of execution.  Given the 
importance of judicial review to ensuring the 
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constitutionality of execution methods, this Court 
has long recognized the right to meaningful Eighth 
Amendment review. 
A. Historically, State Legislatures 
Have Approved Painful And 
Barbaric Methods Of Execution 
Today, all States that provide for capital 
punishment use lethal injection as their exclusive or 
primary means of execution.  See Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35, 42 (2008).  Before lethal injection became 
the preferred method of execution, States employed 
a number of methods ultimately deemed inhumane.  
But each time a State moved toward a method of 
execution thought more humane, experience showed 
the new method resulted in intolerable pain and 
suffering. 
Hanging.  In the mid-nineteenth century, 
hanging was the “nearly universal” method of 
execution in the United States.  Campbell v. Wood, 
511 U.S. 1119, 144 S. Ct. 2125, 2125 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
Although hanging initially was perceived as 
humane, it proved in practice to result in deaths 
through slow strangulation or decapitation.  Id. at 
2127 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Hanging . . . is a 
crude and imprecise practice . . . .”).  By the late 
1800s, hanging had fallen out of favor after the 
public observed brutally botched hangings involving 
decapitations, strangulations, and in some instances, 
a failure to kill.  See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH 
PENALTY:  AN AMERICAN HISTORY 172–75 (2003).  As 
a result, State legislatures sought a “less barbarous” 
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manner of execution.  In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 
444 (1890). 
Electrocution. By the early twentieth century, 
numerous States had replaced hanging with 
electrocution as their primary means of execution, 
driven by the “well grounded belief that electrocution 
is less painful and more humane than hanging.”  
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915).  
Beginning with the first electrocution, however, 
State-sanctioned electrocutions routinely resulted in 
unnecessary pain and lingering death.  See BANNER, 
supra, at 186; Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures 
Delegate Death:  The Troubling Paradox Behind 
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and 
What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 73–74 & 
n.55 (2002) (describing the first person to be 
executed by electrocution as burning and bleeding 
during the procedure).  After years of increased 
public awareness of the pain and gore resulting from 
botched electrocutions,2 the Georgia Supreme Court 
held electrocution violated its State constitution.  See 
Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 139 (Ga. 2001) 
(recognizing that whether a particular punishment 
is cruel and unusual hinges on “evolving standards 
                                            
2  See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary:  
How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 62–63 (2007) (describing 1999 
botched execution of Allen Lee Davis, who suffered deep 
burns, bleeding, and partial asphyxiation from a mouth 
strap installed in the electric chair). 
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of decency” (citation omitted)).3  The Nebraska 
Supreme Court followed suit, reasoning that 
“[e]lectrocution’s proven history of burning and 
charring bodies is inconsistent with both the 
concepts of evolving standards of decency and the 
dignity of man.”  State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 
(Neb. 2008).   
After a particularly grisly execution in the 1990s, 
this Court granted certiorari to assess the 
constitutionality of electrocution in Florida.  See 
generally Bryan, 528 U.S. at 960.  Soon after, 
however, the Florida legislature amended the State’s 
method of execution, permitting a prisoner to choose 
to be executed by lethal injection instead of by 
electrocution.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105 (2000); 
2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2000-2 (West).  This 
Court therefore dismissed the writ in light of the 
statutory amendments.  See generally Bryan v. 
Moore, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000). 
Lethal Gas.  In 1921, the Nevada legislature 
became the first State to authorize lethal gas as the 
State’s method of execution, explaining that the 
State “sought to provide a method of inflicting the 
death penalty in the most humane manner known to 
modern science.”  State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 682 
(Nev. 1923).4  A prisoner executed by this method 
                                            
3  The Georgia legislature already had abolished 
electrocution as a means of execution for offenses 
committed after May 1, 2000.  Dawson, 554 S.E.2d at 144. 
4   Ten other States adopted lethal gas as a means of 
execution by 1955.  See Denno, supra, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 
83. 
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would sit in an enclosed chamber to be filled with 
lethal gas and remain in the chamber until death 
occurred.  See Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1058 
(5th Cir. 1983).  In practice, prisoners did not always 
die peacefully; often they moaned, gasped for air, 
and convulsed for periods longer than ten minutes 
before dying.  See id. at 1058–59 (describing 
eyewitness accounts of gas chamber executions); 
Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death:  Are Executions 
Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, app. 2.B at 
424–28 (1997) (similar).   
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit held that lethal gas 
executions, as authorized by California’s method of 
execution statute, were unconstitutional.  See Fierro 
v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing the 
district court’s findings that lethal gas executions 
would result in extreme pain), vacated on other 
grounds, 519 U.S. 918 (1996).   This Court did not 
address the constitutionality of lethal gas execution; 
instead, it vacated the judgment and remanded the 
case in light of an amendment to California’s statute, 
which made lethal injection the default method of 
execution unless the prisoner chose lethal gas.  See 
generally Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996).  On 
remand, the Ninth Circuit agreed the inmate no 
longer had standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the lethal gas method of 
execution.  See Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158, 
1160 (9th Cir. 1998).  Subsequently, this Court held 
that a prisoner had waived a challenge to the 
constitutionality of lethal gas as an execution 
method by declining the newly adopted option of 
execution by lethal injection.  See Stewart v. 
LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999). 
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Lethal Injection.  Although certain States 
moved toward lethal gas, other States transitioned 
to lethal injection.  In the 1970s, following the end of 
a nine-year execution hiatus while this Court 
considered the constitutionality of the death penalty, 
Oklahoma became the first State to adopt lethal 
injection as a method of execution.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 
41–42.  Certain States quickly followed suit with 
Texas adopting lethal injection a day after 
Oklahoma.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Denno, supra, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. at 78.  Nebraska finally abandoned 
electrocution in favor of lethal injection only in 2009 
after the Nebraska Supreme Court held 
electrocution unconstitutional under the State 
constitution. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection 
Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1341 cht.1, 
1342 (2014). 
From the start, lethal injection proved unlike the 
tranquil form of execution many envisioned.  Early 
observers reported “violent[] gagg[ing],” collapsing 
veins, convulsing, and, in one particularly gruesome 
instance,  “after a lengthy search for an adequate 
vein, the syringe came out of [the prisoner’s] vein, 
spewing deadly chemicals toward startled 
witnesses.”  See Denno, supra, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 
app. 1 at 139–41 tbl.9 (citation omitted). 
The problems with lethal injection executions 
persisted over the years.  Inmates challenged 
protocols implementing lethal injection, with limited 
success.  See, e.g., Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 
2d 1037, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 438 F.3d 926 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding undue risk existed that an 
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inmate would remain conscious during the 
administration of the latter two drugs in the 
protocol, which neither side disputed would result in 
him suffering intense pain); State v. Rivera, No. 
04CR065940,  2008 WL 2784679, slip op. at 1, 9 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008) (emphasizing that 
“the use of two drugs in the lethal injection protocol 
(pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride) 
creates an unnecessary and arbitrary risk that the 
condemned will experience an agonizing and painful 
death”).  In 2014, it took Oklahoma prison officials 
almost an hour to establish intravenous access in the 
execution of Clayton Lockett and Lockett began to 
speak and move after officials thought he had been 
rendered unconscious.  See Glossip, 135. S. Ct. at 
2734.   
States specifically have experienced problems 
implementing protocols using midazolam as the first 
drug in a lethal injection procedure.  In Ohio’s 
execution of Dennis McGuire, McGuire “gasped and 
convulsed for ten to thirteen minutes and took 
twenty-four minutes to die.”  See Eric Berger, Lethal 
Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due 
Process, 55 B.C.L. REV. 1367, 1387 (2014).  Arizona 
conducted a two-hour execution using midazolam in 
which the inmate, Joseph Wood, gasped 600 times 
before dying.  Id.  Oklahoma’s execution of inmate 
Michael Lee Wilson using a midazolam protocol 
resulted in witnesses describing how Wilson cried 
out during his execution, “I feel my whole body 
burning!”  Id. at 1385. 
Despite the well-documented problems with 
methods of execution that cause unconstitutional 
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degrees of pain and suffering—and explicit findings 
of unconstitutionality as to such methods by a 
variety of courts—many States still sanction these 
methods.  Despite the holding that electrocution has 
a “proven history of burning and charring bodies,” 
Mata, 745 N.W.2d at 278, seven States still permit 
execution by electrocution in certain circumstances.  
Cert. Pet. 12 n.7.  Despite the Ninth Circuit 
affirming a district court’s conclusion that lethal gas 
causes an “inmate [to] suffer intense, visceral pain, 
primarily as a result of lack of oxygen,” Fierro, 77 
F.3d at 308, four States authorize lethal gas as an 
alternate method of execution.  Id.  Thus, States 
have indicated a willingness to permit by law the 
implementation of the death penalty through painful 
and barbaric methods of execution. 
B. This Court Recognizes A Prisoner’s 
Right To Meaningful Judicial 
Review Of The Constitutionality Of 
Execution Methods 
Although State legislatures historically have 
adopted painful and barbaric execution methods, 
this Court established long ago the ability of courts 
to review the constitutionality of the implementation 
of the death penalty.  Litigation in recent years has 
served only to confirm this constitutional 
responsibility, as this Court has affirmed an 
individual’s right to judicial review of the method of 
his impending execution.   
In 1890, this Court first reviewed execution by 
electrocution, allowing New York to conduct the first 
electrocution based in part on New York’s 
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articulated motivation of finding a more humane 
method of execution.  See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447–
49.  A century later, as discussed supra, this Court 
agreed to examine the constitutionality of 
electrocution after a particularly gruesome execution 
in Florida.  See Bryan, 528 U.S. 960, writ dismissed 
as improvidently granted, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000). 
Five years after Bryan, this Court permitted a 
prisoner in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004), 
to challenge the planned use of a cut-down 
procedure—a painful and invasive way to establish 
intravenous access—in advance of his lethal 
injection execution.  Id. at 642–46.  Two years later, 
this Court held that prisoners could challenge State 
lethal injection protocols under Section 1983.  See 
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006).  Both 
Nelson and Hill confirmed that an individual has the 
right to challenge the constitutionality of his method 
of execution. 
In 2008, this Court decided Baze, which involved 
a challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol.  
Kentucky’s protocol mandated that a prisoner be 
injected with a three-drug sequence:  a barbiturate 
intended to induce unconsciousness, followed by a 
paralytic agent and then a drug designed to cause 
cardiac arrest.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 45.  The petitioner 
in Baze asserted that the latter two drugs would 
result in serious pain if the first, sodium thiopental, 
were improperly administered, causing the inmate to 
remain conscious during the execution.  Id. at 49.  As 
an alternative, the petitioner proposed that 
Kentucky adopt a one-drug protocol consisting of 
only sodium thiopental.  Id. at 51.  This Court held 
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the petitioner had not shown that the risk of serious 
harm was “substantial” because it was unlikely that 
the executioner would administer an inadequate 
dose of sodium thiopental given the safeguards in 
Kentucky’s protocol.  Id. at 56.  In that regard, the 
risk of harm was not “objectively intolerable” 
because no State had ever used the one-drug 
alternative offered by the prisoner, and the inmate 
did not offer a study showing a one-drug protocol 
would be equally effective.  Id. at 53, 57.  This Court 
further held that Kentucky’s failure to remove the 
paralytic agent from its protocol was not cruel and 
unusual.  Id. at 57–58 (noting that the State has an 
interest in preserving the dignity of the procedure). 
In Baze, this Court outlined for the first time a 
“feasible” and “readily implemented” standard for 
execution alternatives.  This Court held that, 
although “the Constitution does not demand the 
avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out 
executions,” id. at 47, challengers will prevail if 
there is a “substantial risk of serious harm” or an 
“objectively intolerable risk of harm” that “prevents 
prison officials from pleading that they were 
subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment,” id. at 50.  In such cases, the 
alternative procedure must be “feasible, readily 
implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a 
substantial risk of severe pain.”  Id. at 52.  The Baze 
Court placed no restrictions on the types of execution 
alternatives that a claimant may plead, nor did it 
limit possible alternatives to those that the State has 
statutorily approved.  Rather, this Court concluded 
that, if a State “refuses to adopt such an alternative 
in the face of these documented advantages, without 
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a legitimate penological justification for adhering to 
its current method of execution, then a State’s 
refusal to change its method can be viewed as ‘cruel 
and unusual’ under the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. at 
52. 
Glossip reaffirmed Baze’s “feasible” and “readily 
implemented” standard, reiterating that prisoners 
must establish that the method is very likely to 
cause needless suffering to successfully challenge a 
method of execution.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737.  
The Glossip Court considered an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to Oklahoma’s three-drug lethal injection 
protocol.  The Oklahoma protocol at issue called for 
the administration of (1) midazolam, a sedative, 
followed by (2) a paralytic agent, and (3) potassium 
chloride.  See id. at 2734.  The petitioner in Glossip 
specifically challenged the use of midazolam, 
asserting that there was a substantial risk that the 
required 500-milligram dose would not prevent him 
from feeling the painful effects of the potassium 
chloride and paralytic agent.  Id. at 2740.  Experts 
testified that midazolam has a “ceiling effect” after 
which point any marginal increase in dosage would 
prove ineffective in inducing unconsciousness, 
subjecting the prisoner to severe pain when prison 
officials administered the latter two drugs.  Id. at 
2743.   
Nonetheless, this Court held that the petitioner 
had not made an adequate showing of a substantial 
risk of pain because he had failed to put forth 
testimony that the “ceiling effect” occurs below the 
500-milligram dose required by the protocol.  Id.  
This Court further held that the alternative 
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sedatives proposed, sodium thiopental and 
pentobarbital, were unavailable to the State because 
they had been removed entirely from the market.  
Id. at 2733–34, 2738.  Just as in Baze, the Glossip 
Court never limited prisoners challenging the 
method to certain categories of alternatives or to 
state-approved alternatives.  Instead, this Court 
noted that a claimant is required only “to plead and 
prove a known and available alternative.”  Id. at 
2739.   
Under Baze and Glossip, and consistent with 
this Court’s long-standing precedent permitting 
review of the constitutionality of execution methods, 
a prisoner is entitled to relief from any 
unconstitutional method of execution authorized by 
a State legislature.  
II. THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION LIMITS FEASIBLE 
ALTERNATIVES TO THOSE ALREADY 
DELINEATED BY STATE STATUTE 
Like all States with the death penalty, 
Arkansas’s execution statute provides for execution 
by lethal injection.  In 2012, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court ruled that Arkansas’s vague lethal injection 
statute violated the separation of powers doctrine, 
which led to the current statute that identifies 
specific types of execution drugs.  Following this 
Court’s decision in Glossip, an Arkansas court 
determined that Petitioners here plausibly had 
alleged that the State’s use of a certain drug 
combination could cause extreme suffering.  
Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that 
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Petitioners had failed to propose alternative 
protocols that were “feasible” and “readily 
implemented” because such alternatives were not 
already written into the State statute.  In 
combination, the Arkansas Supreme Court decisions 
have served to insulate the State’s execution method 
from judicial review. 
A. Arkansas’s Adoption And 
Implementation Of Lethal Injection 
Arkansas first adopted lethal injection as its 
primary method of execution in 1983.  See Lauren E. 
Murphy, Third Time’s a Charm: Whether Hobbs v. 
Jones Inspired a Durable Change to Arkansas's 
Method of Execution Act, 66 ARK. L. REV. 813, 813 
(2013).  The move to lethal injection followed a 
twenty-three year suspension on executions, which 
began with Governor Winthrop Rockefeller’s 
moratorium in 1967, his grant of clemency to all 
fifteen men on death row in 1970, and this Court’s 
holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  
See Murphy, supra, 66 ARK. L. REV. at 813.5   
                                            
5   Arkansas’s history of executions also has faced public 
scrutiny.  Shortly after the moratorium was lifted, 
Arkansas executed Ricky Ray Rector, who shot himself in 
the head prior to trial and suffered severe brain damage 
as a consequence.  See Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame”:  
Competency and the Execution of Condemned Inmates—A 
Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition 
Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 
14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 105 (1994).  This 
controversial execution led to public backlash because 
many considered it contrary to both State and federal law 
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Prior to 2013, Arkansas’s method-of-execution 
statute delegated discretion to the Director of the 
Department of Corrections to “determine the 
substances to be uniformly administered and the 
procedures to be used in any execution.”  See ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (2009).  In 2012, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court decided Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 
844 (Ark. 2012), which held the existing method-of-
execution statute unconstitutional on its face as 
violating separation of powers.  Id. at 854 (“[T]he 
legislature has abdicated its responsibility and 
passed to the executive branch, in this case the 
[corrections department], the unfettered discretion 
to determine all protocol and procedures, most 
notably the chemicals to be used, for a state 
execution.”).   
Subsequently, the Arkansas legislature amended 
the statute twice, once to address the separation of 
powers concerns and a second time to alter the drug 
cocktail to be used in executions.  See ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-4-617 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 
(2013).  The current Arkansas statute requires that 
a prisoner be executed with an intravenous injection 
of a barbiturate or a sequence of midazolam, 
vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.  ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (2015).  The statute provides 
for an alternative of electrocution, but only if 
                                                                                         
prohibiting the execution of prisoners with severe mental 
deficiencies.  See Peter Applebome, Arkansas Execution 
Raises Questions on Governor’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/25/us/1992-
campaign-death-penalty-arkansas-execution-raises-
questions-governor-s.html. 
  
 
 
 
18 
 
“execution by lethal injection under this section is 
invalidated by a final and unappealable court order.”  
Id. § 5-4-617 (k). 
B. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
Decision Relies Exclusively On 
Glossip’s Known And Available 
Alternative Standard To Hold That 
An Alternative Is Available Only If 
It Is Included In The State Statute 
Petitioners here have challenged the sequence of 
drugs that the legislature has developed.  The 
method, known as the “Midazolam Protocol,” is a 
three-drug lethal injection consisting of 500 
milligrams of midazolam, 100 milligrams of 
vecuronium bromide, and 240 milligrams of 
potassium chloride.  Petitioners argued that the 
Midazolam Protocol is likely to cause extreme pain 
and that five safer means of execution were feasible 
and readily available.   
The Arkansas trial court found evidence that the 
Midazolam Protocol would cause a constitutionally 
unacceptable level of pain.  Cert. Pet. App. 57a.  
Petitioners submitted an affidavit from a doctor of 
pharmacology who detailed the “ceiling effect” for 
midazolam that occurs below the 500 milligram dose 
with which Arkansas indicated it intends to inject 
Petitioners.  Id. at 71a; Cert. Pet. 5.  In other words, 
the midazolam injection would fail to render inmates 
unconscious before injection with the other two 
drugs, which undisputedly cause torturous pain.  
Cert. Pet. App. 71a (noting that “a prisoner sedated 
only with midazolam would experience intense pain 
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and suffering from the administration of vecuronium 
bromide and potassium chloride, but be unable to 
communicate his distress”).  The trial court found 
that Petitioners sufficiently pleaded that midazolam 
may not completely render an individual 
unconscious, making him prone to a substantial risk 
of intolerable pain.  Id. at 71a–72a (“[T]he authority 
to execute Plaintiffs’ death sentences . . . does not 
render Plaintiffs helpless to protect themselves from 
being put to death with lethal injection drugs and 
using a protocol that will subject them to a 
substantial risk of pain.”). 
Ignoring the finding regarding a substantial risk 
of intolerable pain, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
dismissed Petitioners’ constitutional challenge in a 
4-3 vote.  In doing so, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
held that Petitioners had failed to satisfy their 
Eighth Amendment burden to plead alternatives 
under Baze and Glossip.  Id. at 15a.  The court first 
analyzed Petitioners’ identification of alternate 
drugs for use in the protocol, determining that an 
allegation that such drugs are “generally available 
on the open market” was irrelevant as to whether 
the Arkansas Department of Corrections could 
obtain the drugs.  Id. at 19a.  Without such a 
showing, the proposed drug protocols could not be 
considered “feasible” or “readily implemented” under 
Baze and Glossip.  Id.   
Next, the court examined Petitioners’ 
identification of execution by firing squad as a 
feasible alternative.  While the Arkansas Supreme 
Court purported to adopt this Court’s “standards 
enunciated in both Baze and Glossip,” id. at 13a–
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14a, the Arkansas Supreme Court imposed the 
additional requirement that an alternative qualifies 
as “available” for Eighth Amendment purposes only 
if it is already written into the State statute, id. at 
20a.  On this ground, the court rejected Petitioners’ 
identification of the firing squad as an alternative 
method, which Petitioners’ alleged would result in 
instantaneous and painless death and for which 
Petitioners pleaded that the Arkansas Department 
of Corrections had the firearms, bullets, and 
personnel available to carry out an execution.  Id. at 
19a.  The court suggested that, because this method 
“is not identified in the statute as an approved 
means of carrying out a sentence of death,” it is 
therefore not “a readily implemented and available 
option to the present method of execution.”  Id. at 
20a; see also id. (holding that, absent statutory 
authorization, “it cannot be said that the use of a 
firing squad is a readily implemented and available 
option to the present method of execution”).  The 
Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the 
Petitioners failed to satisfy the “known and available 
alternative” requirement under Glossip, resulting in 
dismissal of the Petitioners’ challenge.  Id.  
III. MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
EXECUTION METHODS REQUIRES 
CONSIDERATION OF NON-
STATUTORY ALTERNATIVES 
The requirement that a prisoner identify a 
feasible and readily available alternate execution 
method already in the State statute effectively 
precludes Eighth Amendment review.  Such an 
approach directly conflicts with this Court’s prior 
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execution method cases.  Allowing each State to 
determine the available methods of execution, 
regardless of their constitutionality, would fracture 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, leading to 
varying outcomes based solely on geography.  While 
judicial review historically has served as a catalyst 
for States to adopt more humane methods of 
execution, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach 
would thwart the development of more humane 
methods of execution. 
A. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
Decision Conflicts With This 
Court’s Precedents  
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision directly 
conflicts with this Court’s precedents.  Although 
neither Baze nor Glossip holds that an execution 
alternative must be State-authorized, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court has imposed such a requirement.  
But a State’s refusal to adopt a constitutional 
execution method is, in fact, the very conduct that 
leads to an Eighth Amendment violation under Baze 
and Glossip.  See Baze, 553 U.S. at 50; Glossip, 135 
S. Ct. at 2737.  To require that the “feasible and 
readily implemented” inquiry take into account a 
State legislature’s approval of an execution 
alternative would eviscerate judicial review for 
execution method challenges.   
This Court has reaffirmed that a State violates 
the Eighth Amendment when there exists a 
“substantial risk of serious harm” or an “objectively 
intolerable risk of harm” to an inmate through use of 
a particular execution method.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 50; 
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Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737.  A court addressing such 
a challenge may analyze whether the risk of harm is 
“substantial when compared to a known and 
available alternative method of execution.”  Glossip, 
135 S. Ct. at 2738.  That comparison is not limited to 
statutory alternatives.  See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52, 61.  
If it were so limited, then this Court’s framework for 
analysis would allow a State to skew the comparison 
through its selection—or elimination—of statutory 
alternatives.   
This Court’s decisions in Baze and Glossip 
plainly prevent States from limiting the scope of 
constitutional review in this manner.  This Court 
explicitly held in Baze that “[i]f a State refuses to 
adopt such an alternative in the face of these 
documented advantages, without a legitimate 
penological justification for adhering to its current 
method of execution, then a State’s refusal to change 
its method can be viewed as ‘cruel and unusual’ 
under the Eighth Amendment.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 
52.  Under Baze and Glossip, whether a method of 
execution is feasible and readily implemented is a 
separate issue from whether a State legislature 
considered, put to a vote, and passed a statute 
enabling the State to employ the alternative.  See 
Arthur, 2016 WL 6500595, at *45 (Wilson, J., 
dissenting).  The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, 
conflated these two distinct aspects of Baze by 
determining that an alternative is “unavailable” if it 
does not appear in the State’s statute, despite 
“documented advantages.”  See Arthur, 2016 WL 
6500595, at *50 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Those are 
clearly distinct inquiries.  An alternative can have 
the documented advantages of being feasible and 
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readily implemented even though a state refuses to 
adopt the alternative.”).   
Because this Court’s decisions hold that the 
relevant inquiry is the State’s “refus[al] to adopt” an 
alternative, Baze, 553 U.S. at 52, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s decision prohibiting inmates from 
relying on non-statutory alternatives directly 
conflicts with Baze and Glossip. 
B. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
Decision Fractures Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence 
Accepting the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
construction of Baze and Glossip also would lead to 
inconsistent outcomes, allowing prisoners in some 
States to challenge their method of execution under 
the Eighth Amendment, but eliminating this right 
for others.  Under this approach, an inmate could be 
executed in one State by use of an unduly painful 
method ruled unconstitutional in another State 
simply because the first State’s statute provided for 
a feasible alternate method while the second State’s 
statute did not.  Mere geography should not dictate 
the contours of the Eighth Amendment.  
This Court has made clear that “there is an 
important need for uniformity in federal law.” 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983); Vacco 
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (“States must treat 
like cases alike.”). Forcing prisoners to point to a 
preexisting method of execution in a State’s statute 
would lead to varying outcomes based on the State in 
which the prisoner was convicted.  In fifteen States, 
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lethal injection is the only statutory method of 
execution.  Cert. Pet. 12 n.6.  Five of these States—
Colorado, Mississippi, Montana, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania—provide a specific combination of 
drugs that should be used.  Id. at 12 n.7.  In these 
five States, plaintiffs would be barred from 
advancing any alternative execution method under 
the rule the Arkansas Supreme Court advanced, as 
the respective State statutes provide only one option.  
The remaining ten State statutes do not specify the 
drugs to be used and instead delegate the exact 
lethal injection protocol to department of corrections 
personnel.  Prisoners in these States may continue to 
challenge lethal injection protocols, but may be 
restricted in such challenges by the types of drugs 
(e.g., a “paralytic agent”) required by the statute. 
Of the remaining sixteen States that have 
method-of-execution statutes, fifteen provide only 
one other option in the statute.  Id.  Seven of these 
fifteen States provide the only alternative as 
electrocution.  Id.  Three of these States include the 
only alternative as hanging.  Id.  Both of these 
methods of execution have been basically abandoned 
in recent years due to their barbaric and inhumane 
nature. See supra Section I.  Yet the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s interpretation would restrict 
prisoners to precisely these alternatives. 
Effectively, if the State statute restricts the 
scope of Eighth Amendment review, then the Eighth 
Amendment will have different meanings in 
different States.  This Court could not have intended 
its decisions in Glossip and Baze to result in such a 
patchwork application of the Eighth Amendment.  
  
 
 
 
25 
 
C. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
Decision Creates Perverse 
Incentives For State Legislatures 
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach also 
has the potential to—and, indeed, foreshadows the 
likelihood that it will—inhibit the development of 
more humane methods of execution.      
Not only would the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
construction of Glossip and Baze leave Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence inconsistent and 
incoherent, it also would prevent prisoners from 
proposing more humane methods of execution.  
Under the Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach, a 
State may pass legislation severely limiting 
alternative methods to render it impossible for an 
inmate to meet the comparative analysis.  If a State 
statute only provides for one excruciatingly painful 
method of execution, a prisoner could not plead an 
Eighth Amendment violation because no alternative 
method would be “feasible and readily available.”  As 
a result, prisoners could never challenge the State’s 
execution protocol.  
The detrimental consequences of such an 
interpretation are easily identifiable.  The threat of 
judicial review of a particular method of execution 
prompts legislatures to move toward less barbaric 
methods.  Legislatures will lack incentives to enact 
more humane methods of execution because 
prisoners would be left with no recourse to challenge 
the manner in which they are put to death absent an 
existing statutory alternative.  State statutes could 
remain completely stagnant in a deliberate effort to 
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insulate States from constitutional challenges.  And, 
in fact, instead of encouraging States to adopt more 
humane methods of execution—as prior judicial 
review of execution methods has done—the 
Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Baze 
and Glossip would permit States to adopt more 
restrictive and barbarous method-of-execution 
statutes with the specific intent of thwarting judicial 
review.  In effect, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
opinion converts this Court’s test set forth in Baze 
and Glossip—a test designed to protect the 
constitutional rights of those facing the death 
penalty—into a means of avoiding judicial review of 
potential violations of those rights. The Baze and 
Glossip Courts did not intend such a result. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant the petition for 
certiorari and summarily reverse the Arkansas 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
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